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Abstract—To accommodate heterogeneous tasks in Internet of
Things (IoT), a new communication and computing paradigm
termed mobile edge computing emerges that extends computing
services from the cloud to edge, but at the same time exposes new
challenges on security. The present paper studies online security-
aware edge computing under jamming attacks. Leveraging online
learning tools, novel algorithms abbreviated as SAVE-S and
SAVE-A are developed to cope with the stochastic and adversarial
forms of jamming, respectively. Without utilizing extra resources
such as spectrum and transmission power to evade jamming
attacks, SAVE-S and SAVE-A can select the most reliable server
to offload computing tasks with minimal privacy and security
concerns. It is analytically established that without any prior
information on future jamming and server security risks, the
proposed schemes can achieve O(√T ) regret. Information shar-
ing among devices can accelerate the security-aware computing
tasks. Incorporating the information shared by other devices,
SAVE-S and SAVE-A offer impressive improvements on the
sublinear regret, which is guaranteed by what is termed “value
of cooperation.” Effectiveness of the proposed schemes is tested
on both synthetic and real datasets.
Index Terms—Cyber security, mobile edge computing, online
learning, multi-armed bandit, jamming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) impact every aspect of daily life
ranging from healthcare, video recognition in smart homes and
smart cities, to monitoring smart grids [1]. Among these, vari-
ous latency-sensitive applications such as autonomous driving
and virtual reality raise new challenges to the current IoT
paradigms; e.g., a critical question is how to simultaneously
meet the demands of huge volume and latency-sensitive data
requests under limited computation power of IoT devices.
Clearly, cloud computing is encountering growing challenges
in meeting such new requirements in IoT. Since the concept
was first proposed in 2009 [2], edge computing has been
viewed as a promising solution by subsiding the computing
capability from cloud to edge servers to facilitate real-time
computation services [1], [3]–[6].
Although edge computing enables offloading computation-
ally intensive tasks to the edge, security issues could prevent
one from fully embracing its advantages [7]–[10]. As an
example, although edge computing facilitates location based-
services (e.g., social networks), users’ location information is
also exposed to edge nodes as well, from which a “malicious”
edge node can pry into users’ privacy [9]. In addition, data
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collected from critical infrastructure such as smart grids need
also to be veiled in order to prevent blackouts and other
malicious attacks. However, the high-complexity encryption
techniques with complicated cipher-decipher processes are
usually not computationally affordable for IoT devices (e.g.,
sensors in smart grids) [9]. One approach to coping with such
privacy concerns is to allow devices to choose their trusted
service on-demand with the so-called “transparent computing
model” [11], while the trustworthiness of edge servers could
be evaluated by the trust management services [12].
Besides privacy concerns, jamming and eavesdropping - the
two main attacks at the physical layer [13], [14] - are still an
issue for IoT systems. This work mainly focuses on security-
aware edge computing under jamming attacks that will block
the communication link between IoT devices and edge servers;
see [15] for schemes dealing with eavesdropping.
Existing works dealing with jamming attacks can be cat-
egorized to those on anomaly detection [16] and jamming
mitigation [7], [8], [17]–[21]. Most incorporate extra resources
such as power and spectrum to alleviate the effect of jamming.
Optimal power allocation schemes for jamming attacks were
studied in [17]. Assuming a low-power jammer, Bayesian
game based anti-jamming strategies were reported in [8], [18].
However, for IoT devices with limited battery capacity, excess
power consumption is not always affordable. On the other
hand, spectrum allocation to evade jamming was considered
in [7] for cognitive radio based IoT networks. Frequency hop-
ping strategies without pre-shared secrets, a.k.a. uncoordinated
frequency hopping, was adopted in [19], where a multi-armed
bandit (MAB) scheme was introduced to allocate frequency
bands only considering one transmitter-receiver pair; and in
[20] for large-scale and more sophisticated cognitive radio
networks. Recent efforts were also devoted to improve energy
efficiency via channel hopping based anti-jamming schemes.
An MAB-based channel selection with an additional online
gradient ascent to maximize energy efficiency was proposed
in [21]. However, due to IoT devices operating over different
frequency bands, spectrum expansion-based schemes have
limited appeal especially for the spectrum-scarce IoT setups.
In this paper, we develop novel approaches to tackle the
security-aware edge computing problem based on MAB with
sleeping arms [22]–[24], where the number of accessible
servers can be time-varying. Specifically, each IoT device
progressively learns the risk associated with edge servers and
adaptively chooses an edge server to offload computing tasks
among all available servers per slot. In addition, we further
consider the case where IoT devices can share information
to cooperatively achieve security-aware edge computing. To
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2account for the mobility of IoT devices, we model the com-
munication links as a time-varying directed graph. Under this
model, performance gain of leveraging cooperation in securing
edge computing is also rigorously established.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
c1) Leveraging the MAB framework, we develop SAVE-
S and SAVE-A algorithms to deal with edge comput-
ing under stochastic and adversarial jamming attacks,
respectively. Incorporating the information shared by
allied devices, SAVE-S and SAVE-A can accelerate the
security-aware computing.
c2) We analytically establish that an O(√T ) regret can be
achieved by both SAVE-S and SAVE-A, and benefit
from device cooperation with markedly lower risks -
a quantifiable performance gain of cooperation that we
call the value of cooperation.
c3) Simulation tests have been conducted using both syn-
thetic and real data to showcase the effectiveness of the
proposed schemes, and confirm the value of cooperation
for security-aware computing.
Notations: E denotes the expectation; 1 denotes the indicator
function; (·)> stands for vector transposition; x, while inequal-
ities for vectors are defined entry-wise.
II. MODELS AND PROBLEM STATEMENTS
This section introduces the models and the formulation of
the security-aware problem under jamming attacks.
A. Modeling preliminaries
Consider an IoT network with a set of K := {1, 2, . . . ,K}
edge servers to serve computational requestes for a set of IoT
devices J := {1, 2, . . . , J}. Per slot t, the task of device j
is denoted by a tuple (cjt , s
j
t ) with c
j
t denoting the required
resources (e.g., CPU cycles) to complete the task, and sjt the
size of computation task (the data input and the associated
processing code) [5], [25].
Security risk. When an edge server is being attacked, it can
behave unfaithfully or intentionally sabotage the computation
tasks. Therefore, to alleviate such a compromise on privacy,
an IoT device has to select the most reliable edge server
for offloading computing tasks; see a diagram for security-
aware edge computing in Fig. 1. To measure the edge server’s
reliability, we rely on the security risk, which depends on e.g.,
the number of attacks within a slot duration [12]. Let γ1,t(k)
denote the unit risk of computing at server k, and γ2,t(k) the
unit risk for privacy information leakage at server k, measured
as in [12]. Furthermore, let ρj ∈ [0, 1] denote a device-specific
weight on security; e.g., a larger ρj can be used for safety-
sensitive tasks involved in autonomous vehicle and healthcare,
while a smaller ρj can be adopted by sensors in smart homes
and smart grids where privacy is the first priority. Per slot t,
the security risk for device j choosing server k is modeled by
[26]
rjt (k) = ρjc
j
tγ1,t(k) + (1− ρj)sjtγ2,t(k). (1)
Note that the up-to-date security evaluation is available only
after the IoT devices communicate with edge servers; that is,
γ1,t(k) and γ2,t(k) are obtained at the end of slot t.
Fig. 1. Security-aware edge computing diagram.
Jamming attacks. Malicious attackers can also sabotage the
IoT devices with jamming attacks, which block their access to
edge servers [13], [14]. Jammers can be classified as stochastic
jammers, which attack the IoT devices with a fixed probability;
or, as adversarial jammers intelligently deciding which edge
servers to block [8]. With the presence of jammers, collect the
accessible servers for device j in Kjt ⊆ K, from which device
j selects the most reliable server. Due to the directionality of
jamming, for two different devices j and j′, it is possible that
Kjt 6= Kj
′
t . Note that r
j
t (k) for jammed server k /∈ Kjt is still
well-defined, but server k cannot be selected by device j and
thus rjt (k) is not revealed.
Device cooperation. Information sharing can assist the
security-aware computation task at the edge. In this setup,
information sharing takes places at the edge server as well
as at the IoT devices side. Cooperation is forbidden at the
edge server side, since it can expose serious privacy concerns
by providing an extra medium for malware transportation [27].
To expedite the server selection procedure, information sharing
among devices can be beneficial. Per slot t, after device j
observes γ1,t(k) and γ2,t(k), it can communicate this infor-
mation to its neighbors. Note that since the communication
among devices demands extra energy, whether to participate
in cooperation is device specific. Assume that information
sharing is unidirectional, meaning that it is possible for j′
to receive information from j, but not vise versa.
In a nutshell, we wish to solve the following problem in an
online fashion,
min
{ajt∈Kjt ,∀t,∀j}
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
J∑
j=1
rjt (k)1(a
j
t = k) (2)
where ajt denotes the selected server by device j. In addition
to solving (2) with stochastic or adversarial jammers, the
benefit of cooperation among devices is also of interest. Note
that when the present formulation consider a setting without
explicit constraints, it can be readily extended to incorporate
long-term constraints; see e.g., [24], [28].
B. Reformulation as online linear programming
Since the security risk rjt (a
j
t ) is revealed afterwards, in-
tuitively, the device should select servers according to the
historical performance of servers, while allowing for flexibility
to choose other servers. In par with this guideline, suppose
device j is allowed to randomly select a server from a given
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Fig. 2. A side observation graph with node setK = {1, · · · , 6}. The available
servers set for device j isKjt = {2, 3, 4} with green nodes. The arrow pointed
to each node itself is omitted for better visibility. (a) considers ajt = 2 and
side observations are the security risks of server 3 and server 5. (b) considers
the ajt = 3 and the only information shared is also about server 3.
distribution ajt ∼ pjt ∈ RK . Problem (2) can be then
reformulated as optimization over {pjt}Tt=1, namely
min
{pjt∈∆(Kjt),∀t,j}
T∑
t=1
J∑
j=1
(
pjt
)>
rjt (3)
where the Kjt -related “probability simplex” is defined as
∆(Kjt ) :=
{
p ∈ RK+
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
k∈Kt
p(k) = 1; p(k)=0, k /∈ Kjt
}
(4)
with p(k) denoting the k-th entry of p. The logic behind the
probability pjt in (3) is that a randomized server selection
scheme may have better performance in expectation than
deterministic schemes in the worst case [29, Theorem 1.1]. For
security considerations, a deterministic algorithm implicitly
impairs security since adversaries can potentially infer the
strategies in use given knowledge of the implemented algo-
rithms. The problem (3) is simply a linear program, and thus
can be readily solved had we known the sequence {rjt}Tt=1
as well as the accessible server sets {Kjt}Tt=1. However, the
challenge arises due to the causal knowledge of the security
risks {rjt}Tt=1, and the difficulty here also comes from the
need of adaptively choosing the edge server according to a
time-varying feasibility set pjt ∈ ∆(Kjt ).
III. EDGE COMPUTING UNDER STOCHASTIC JAMMING
This section deals with edge server selection problem for
stochastic jammers, where Kjt follows a random process with
an unknown but fixed distribution.
A. Cooperation via a graph-encoded feedback
The information sharing among devices can be modeled
through directed graphs [30]–[32]. Consider a single IoT
device j, which at the end of slot t obtains the security risk of
the selected edge server ajt as well as other servers’ security
risk (a.k.a. side observations) shared by other devices.
To account for the mobility of IoT devices, and the asym-
metry of communication links, we model the side observations
for device j via a time-varying directed graph Gjt . In this graph,
the node sets are the server set K; and the side observations
form a subset of the node sets; thus, Sjt ⊆ K. Note the Sjt is
not necessarily a subset of Kjt , meaning that it is possible for
device j to obtain the security risk of inaccessible edge servers
via information sharing. The directed edge (k1, k2) from node
(server) k1 to node (server) k2 indicates that when device j
chooses server k1, it can also observe (via information shared
by other devices) the security risk associated with server k2.
For each node, there is an edge pointing to itself; see an
example in Fig. 2. The underlying graph associated with each
device j captures the observability relationship among servers.
To facilitate the analysis and explicitly quantify the impact
of information sharing, a few notations from graph theory are
introduced [32]. An independent set of an undirected graph
is a set of vertices that are not connected by any edges;
while the so-termed independence number αjt is the cardinality
of the maximum independent set. For the example in Fig.
2 (a), we have αjt = 4 with the largest independent set
being {1, 2, 4, 6}; while in (b) αjt = 5, with independent
set {1, 2, 4, 5, 6}. When the device j does not receive any
side observation, we have αjt = K, which is also the upper
bound on αjt . Intuitively, per device j at slot t, α
j
t reflects
its knowledge of the global information on security risks,
with a smaller value αjt indicating high connectivity of the
information graph (more side observations), thus implying
more secure computing performance.
B. SAVE-S for stochastic jamming
Given the underlying side observation graphs, we are ready
to develop the proposed algorithm that we call Security-Aware
edge serVer sElection under stochastic jamming (SAVE-S).
The SAVE-S algorithm leverages side information shared by
other devices to assist the learning procedure, while also ac-
counting for the heterogeneity of devices via adaptive stepsizes
for improved performance.
Aiming to solve (3) for each device, per slot t, SAVE-S first
evaluates each server’s historical performance via
wjt (k) = exp
(
− ηjt Rˆjt−1(k)
)
, ∀k ∈ K (5)
where ηjt plays the role of a stepsize, and Rˆ
j
t−1(k) is the
accumulated security risk, given by
Rˆjt−1(k) =
t−1∑
τ=1
rˆjτ (k), ∀k ∈ K (6)
where rˆjt (k) is the estimated security risk, which will be
formally defined soon. Then after the server set Kjt is revealed,
device j finds the server selection probability as
pjt (k) =
wjt (k)1
(
k ∈ Kt
)∑
m∈Kjt w
j
t (m)
. (7)
It is clear that for servers k /∈ Kjt , we have pjt (k) = 0. With
pjt , a server a
j
t is chosen, and the corresponding security risk is
revealed after the edge computing task is finished. Information
sharing among IoT devices is then effected, from which device
j is informed about the security risks of servers Sjt ⊆ K.
Note that it is possible to have ajt ∈ Sjt . Usually in MAB
algorithms, an unbiased estimator is usually adopted [29], [33],
4Algorithm 1 SAVE-S for IoT device j
1: Initialize: weight wj1 = 1/K, implicit explore factor µ
j
t ,
learning rate ηjt .
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
3: Compute wjt via (5).
4: Available server set Kjt is revealed.
5: Compute pjt via (7) and choose server a
j
t ∼ pjt .
6: Receive γ1,t(a
j
t ) and γ2,t(a
j
t ).
7: Broadcastγ1,t(a
j
t )andγ2,t(a
j
t )to devices in {i | j∈Sit}.
8: Compute security risk for {ajt} ∪ Sjt via (1).
9: Estimate the security risk via (8).
10: end for
[34]. Differently, here we adopt a biased but reduced-variance
estimator [30], given by
rˆjt (k) =

rjt (k)1
(
k=ajt
)
µjt+p
j
t(k)
, ∀k /∈ Sjt
rjt (k)
µjt+1
, ∀k ∈ Sjt
(8)
which can be compactly written as
rˆjt (k) =
rjt (k)1
(
k ∈ {ajt ∪ Sjt }
)
µjt +
∑
(m,k)∈Gjt p
j
t (m)
, ∀k ∈ K (9)
where (m, k) ∈ Gjt denotes all the edges pointing from node
m to node k in the underlying graph Gjt . The rationale behind
the biased estimators (8) stems from well known bias-variance
tradeoff encountered with MAB. It is clear from (8) that since
µjt > 0, the security risk is always underestimated
E
[
rˆjt (k)
]
=
(∑
(m,k)∈Gjt p
j
t (m)
)
rjt (k)
µjt +
∑
(m,k)∈Gjt p
j
t (m)
< rjt (k). (10)
For the squared mean, we have
E
[(
rˆjt (k)
)2]
=
(
rjt (k)
)2∑
(m,k)∈Gjt p
j
t (m)(
µjt+
∑
(m,k)∈Gjt p
j
t (m)
)2
<
(
rjt (k)
)2
µjt+
∑
(m,k)∈Gjt p
j
t (m)
. (11)
Comparing with EXP3 in [33], [34], the mean-square of the
SAVE-S estimator is smaller due to the presence of µjt . The
SAVE-S algorithm is summarized in Alg. 1.
C. Regret analysis
To evaluate the performance of SAVE-S, the first step is
to seek a suitable benchmark for this setting. Unlike the best
fixed server or server distribution in a standard MAB setup
[29], [33], [34], here the benchmark accounting for jammed
servers is selected to be the best fixed server list [22], [23]. To
concretely define this benchmark, we first introduce the notion
of a server list φj ∈ NK for device j that is a permutation of
server indices. Then let Φj(Kjt ) represent the highest ranked
server in list φj that is also in Kjt ; e.g., for K = 3 servers, if
φj := {2, 3, 1}, and Kjt = {1, 3}, then we have Φj(Kjt ) = 3.
Furthermore, let φj∗ denote the best server list satisfying
T∑
t=1
rjt
(
φj∗(1)
) ≤ · · · ≤ T∑
t=1
rjt
(
φj∗(K)
)
(12)
where φj∗(i) is the i-th ranked server in φj∗. Correspondingly,
define Φj∗
(Kjt), which maps Kjt to the highest ranked index
in server list φj∗. Then device j incurs regret
RegjT :=
T∑
t=1
E
[
rjt (a
j
t )
]− T∑
t=1
rjt
(
Φj∗(Kjt )
)
. (13)
The rationale behind this regret definition is that instead
of sticking to the best server in hindsight which might be
unaccessible, we resort to the best available server in φj∗.
The following assumption is used in the subsequent analysis.
(as1) The security risk satisfies maxt,j,k rjt (k) ≤ 1.
Basically, (as1) requires the security risk to be bounded,
which is typical for online learning [28], [29], [33], [34].
Building on (as1), the following theorem establishes the regret
bound.
Theorem 1. For stochastically chosen Kjt , the regret for
device j can be bounded by
E
[
RegjT
] ≤ E[ T∑
t=1
(
µjt +
ηjt
2
)
Qjt +
lnK
ηT+1
]
(14)
where the expectation is over the randomness of Kjt , and the
auxiliary variable Qjt is
Qjt :=
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)
µjt +
∑
(m,k)∈Gjt p
j
t (m)
. (15)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The bound on E
[
RegjT
]
for SAVE-S depends on an auxil-
iary variable Qjt capturing the influence of side observations as
well as the biased rˆjt (k). For example, in EXP3 (with µ
j
t = 0
and no side information), we have Qjt =
∑K
k=1 p
j
t (k)/p
j
t (k) =
K. For SAVE-S, it is shown in Lemma 3 of Appendix B
that Qjt is bounded by min{K,αjt + 1}. Intuitively, a small
αjt associated with a closely connected graph Gjt will lead to
lower regret.
To evaluate the performance gain of cooperation, we revisit
the performance without information sharing among devices.
Corollary 1. Consider the case without device cooperation,
e.g., skip line 7 in Alg. 1. If the stepsizes are chosen as ηjt =√
lnK/(KT ) and µjt =
ηjt
2 ,∀t, the regret is bounded by
E
[
RegjT
] ≤ 2√TK lnK (16)
where the expectation is w.r.t. the randomness of the servers’
availability. If ηjt =
√
lnK
2Kt , ∀t and µjt = η
j
t
2 ,∀t, we have
E
[
RegjT
] ≤ 2√2TK lnK. (17)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Corollary 1 asserts that if we choose fixed ηjt and µ
j
t , an
O(√TK lnK) regret is guaranteed even without cooperation,
which matches that of [22], [23]. Instead, if we choose
5diminishing ηjt and µ
j
t , a slightly worse bound can be achieved.
Then in the following corollary, we present a tighter bound by
adopting the underlying graph introduced earlier.
Corollary 2. If the devices cooperate and we choose stepsizes
adaptively, namely, ηjt =
√
(lnK)/
(
K +
∑t−1
τ=1Q
j
τ
)
, and
µjt = η
j
t /2,∀t, the regret can be bounded as
E
[
RegjT
]≤ 2E[
√√√√(δ + T∑
t=1
Qjt
)
lnK
]
≈ 2E
[√√√√ T∑
t=1
Qjt lnK
]
(18)
where δ := mint{K − Qjt}, and the expectation is w.r.t. the
randomness of the servers’ availability.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The stepsizes ηjt and µ
j
t depend only on the history, regard-
less of the current Qjt . At first glance, it is clear that the bound
in (18) is better than (16) and (17) since
∑T
t=1Q
j
t ≤ KT . To
characterize the value of cooperation, define the cooperation
value λj for device j as the regret bound in (18) divided by
that in (16), which quantifies the improvement of leveraging
cooperation among devices. Ideally, λj ≤ 1 suggests that the
cooperation reduces the security risk in the worst case. In
addition, the cooperation value for this IoT network is the
average of λj , namely
λ =
1
J
J∑
j=1
λj :=
1
J
J∑
j=1
E
[√(
δ +
∑T
t=1Q
j
t
)
lnK
]
√
TK lnK
. (19)
The upper bound of the cooperation value λ is given in the
following corollary.
Corollary 3. The cooperation value of SAVE-S satisfies
λ ≤ 1
J
J∑
j=1
√√√√ 1
T
+
1
KT
T∑
t=1
min
{
K,K + 1− |Sjt |
}
. (20)
Proof. See Appendix B.
The bound in (20) asserts that more side observations reduce
the regret. Specifically, suppose K/2 servers’ information can
be obtained by device j via information sharing. In this case,
we have |Sjt | = K2 , which leads to λj ≤
√
1
T +
1
2 +
1
K .
The multiple choices of stepsizes are also tailored for the
heterogeneity of IoT devices. For those isolated devices, fixed
µjt and η
j
t could be adopted; and for those devices with suf-
ficient side observations, adaptive stepsizes are recommended
for improved performance.
IV. EDGE COMPUTING UNDER ADVERSARIAL JAMMING
The stochastic jamming considered so far is relatively
simple to deal with since the accessible servers are invariant
in expectation, even if their realization is time-varying. In this
section, we introduce schemes for adversarial jammers.
A. From server to server list selection
With insights gained from [22] and [23], the high-level idea
is to deal with the available server set in the presence of
adversaries, by expanding the search space from the best single
server to the best server ordering (a.k.a. server list). Recall
that a server list φ ∈ NK is a permutation of server indices.
Let set Kˇ collect all the permutations of K with cardinality
Kˇ := |Kˇ| = K!. With φjt denoting the server list selected by
IoT device j at slot t and the current available set Kjt , Φjt (Kjt )
represents the highest ranked server in the list φjt that is also
in Kjt , see Fig. 3 (a) for example. Given the available server
set Kjt for device j, the mapping Φjt (·) plays the role of a
policy at time t, which outputs the arm ajt . Therefore, if we
use a Kˇ×K matrix Γ(Kjt ) to represent all these mappings at
time t, the (i, k)th entry of Γ(Kjt ) can be written as[
Γ(Kjt )
]
i,k
= 1(Φji (Kjt ) = k). (21)
Accordingly, for adversarial jammers, (3) can be rewritten as
the following problem over distributions {qjt}, namely
min
{qjt∈∆Kˇ ,∀j}
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
(
qjt
)>
rˇjt (22)
where rˇjt is a Kˇ-dimensional vector, rˇ
j
t = Γ(Kjt )rjt ; and the
Kˇ-dimensional probability simplex is defined as
∆Kˇ :=
q ∈ RKˇ+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
k∈Kˇ
q(k) = 1
 . (23)
Instead of finding a K-dimensional vector pj to weigh all the
servers, our solution here is to search for a Kˇ-dimensional
vector qj that weighs all the server lists in Kˇ. The following
lemma establishes that (3) is equivalent to (22).
Lemma 1. For each pjt , there exists at least one q
j
t ∈ ∆Kˇ ,
such that
(
qjt
)>
rˇjt =
(
pjt
)>
rjt .
Proof. See Appendix E.
Another advantage of expanding the search space to a server
list is reflected on the regret analysis. The benchmark to
compare with in (13) is exactly the best server list φj∗, which
is equivalent to finding qj∗ = [0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0]>, namely,
Φj∗(Kjt ) =
(
qj∗
)>
Γ(Kjt )rjt =
(
qj∗
)>
rˇjt . (24)
The regret in (13) can be rewritten as [cf. (24)]
RegjT =
T∑
t=1
(
qjt
)>
rˇjt −
(
qj∗
)>
rˇjt (25)
which will further facilitate the analysis.
B. SAVE-A for adversarial jamming
For (22), one can still implement EXP3 [33] over the ex-
panded search space ∆Kˇ , but its efficiency can be significantly
improved with cooperation among devices. Tailored for this
setting, we will develop next a Security-Aware edge serVer
sElection under adversarial jammer (SAVE-A) algorithm.
To address the challenge, we can again rely on the graph-
encoded feedback structure. However, corresponding to the
enlarged search space, the node set of Gjt comprises all server
lists and thus has cardinality Kˇ. Different from the stochastic
setup, instead of selecting a signle server directly, we are
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Fig. 3. A graph representation of side observation with each node denoting
a server list. (a) considers K = {1, 2, 3}, with Kjt = {2, 3} and no side
observation. The directed arrows from node (server list) φjmt to φ
jn
t denotes
that when selecting list φjmt , the security risk of φ
jn
t is also revealed. The
green lines connect server lists with Φjt (Kt) = 2, while Φjt (Kt) = 3 are
linked through the blue lines. (b) considers active set Kjt = {2, 3}, but with
side observation Sjt = {1}. The red lines are the changes compared with (a).
seeking the best server list, where cooperation plays a more
important role. That is to say, in addition to adding new
edges in the underlying graph, the side observations change
the structure of the original graph. With reference to Fig. 3,
the side observation Sjt = {1} changes the original graph
in two ways: i) it changes the structure by creating a virtual
available set K˜jt := Kjt∪Sjt ; although the original available set
is Kjt = {2, 3}, with side observation Sjt = {1}, some nodes
are enabled to have Φjt
(K˜jt) = {1}; and, ii) it introduces
extra edges from each node (server list) to server lists with
Φjt
(K˜jt) = {1}.
Building upon the side information graph Gjt , an approach
is developed next, in the search space ∆Kˇ . Specifically, IoT
device j maintains a weight wjt ∈ RKˇ . Per slot t, based on
the historical security risks, evaluation on each server lists’
performances is carried out via
wjt (k) = exp
(
− ηjt Rˆjt−1(k)
)
, ∀k ∈ Kˇ (26)
where the estimated cumulative risk Rˆjt−1(k) is given by
Rˆjt−1(k) =
t−1∑
τ=1
rˆjτ (k), ∀k ∈ Kˇ (27)
with rˆjt (k) being the estimated security risk encountered with
by server list k at slot t. Then after the available set Kjt is
revealed, device j computes the probability of selecting server
list k ∈ Kˇ by normalizing wjt (k); that is
qjt (k) =
wjt (k)∑
m∈Kˇ w
j
t (m)
. (28)
Then a server list φjt is chosen according to the distribution
qjt , followed by the selection of an edge server a
j
t = Φ
j
t
(Kjt).
After the computation tasks are finished, device j observes
the security risk of ajt as well as Sjt , upon which the side
observation graph Gjt is constructed. Then estimators of rˇjt
are formed as
rˆjt (k) =

rˇjt (k)1
(
ajt=k
)
µjt+
∑
(m,k)∈Gjt
qjt (m)
, ∀k = Φjt
(K˜jt) /∈ Sjt
rˇjt (k)
µjt+1
, ∀k = Φjt
(K˜jt) ∈ Sjt
(29)
Algorithm 2 SAVE-A for IoT device j
1: Initialize: weight wj1 = 1/Kˇ, exploration factor µ
j
t , and
learning rate ηjt .
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
3: Compute wjt via (26).
4: Available server set Kjt is revealed.
5: Compute qjt via (28) and choose server list φ
j
t ∼ qjt .
6: Select serverajt=Φ
j
t
(Kjt), receiveγ1,t(ajt )andγ2,t(ajt ).
7: Broadcastγ1,t(a
j
t )andγ2,t(a
j
t ) to devices in{i | j∈Sit}.
8: Compute security risk for {ajt} ∪ Sjt via (1).
9: Estimate risk via (29).
10: end for
which are then adopted to update Rˆjt (k). The proposed SAVE-
A approach is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Remark 1. To reduce the computation and memory com-
plexity of SAVE-A, one pertinent idea is to leverage recent
advances on function approximation to represent Γ(·) via the
low-dimensional random basis functions “on-the-fly” [35].
C. Performance analysis
In this subsection, we analytically assess the performance
of SAVE-A.
Theorem 2. For adversarially chosen Kjt , the regret of SAVE-
A in (25) can be bounded by
RegjT ≤
T∑
t=1
(
µjt +
ηjt
2
)
Qjt +
ln Kˇ
ηT+1
(30)
where Qjt is defined as
Qjt :=
Kˇ∑
k=1
qjt (k)
µjt +
∑
(m,k)∈Gjt q
j
t (m)
. (31)
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1, and it is
thus omitted.
Similar to Corollary 1, choosing ηjt =
√
ln Kˇ/(KT ) and
µjt = η
j
t /2,∀t, the regret of Algorithm 2 without device
cooperation is bounded by
RegjT ≤ 2
√
TK ln Kˇ
(a)
= O(√TK2 lnK) (32)
where (a) follows from the Stirling’s approximation ln Kˇ =
K lnK −K +O(lnK). If instead ηjt =
√
ln Kˇ
2Kt and µ
j
t =
ηjt
2 ,
the regret of Algorithm 2 without cooperation is bounded as
RegjT ≤ 2
√
2TK ln Kˇ = O(√TK2 lnK). (33)
The following corollary establishes the sublinear regret
when SAVE-A is employed with cooperation.
Corollary 4. If ηjt =
√
(ln Kˇ)/
(
K +
∑t−1
τ=1Q
j
τ
)
, and µjt =
ηjt /2,∀t, then
RegjT ≤2
√√√√(δ + T∑
t=1
Qjt
)
ln Kˇ=O
(√√√√ T∑
t=1
QjtKlnK
)
(34)
where δ := mint{K −Qjt}.
70 100 200 300 400
Time slot
1.5
1.75
2
2.25
2.5
Ti
m
e 
av
er
ag
e 
se
cu
rit
y 
ris
k
SAVE-S-f
SAVE-S-d
SAVE-S-a
SAVE-A-f
SAVE-A-d
SAVE-A-a
EXP4G
1.75
Fig. 4. A comparison of SAVE-S and SAVE-A without cooperations under
stochastic jamming attacks.
Proof. The proof of (34) follows similar steps as that of
Corollary 2, and thus it is omitted.
Compared with Corollaries 1 and 2, the bound in (34)
has slightly worse dependence on K due to the expansion
of the search spaces. Similar to the stochastic case, we will
rely on cooperation value λ as the device-averaged ratio of
the upper bound in (34) and that of (32). Through λ, the
ensuing corollary quantifies how side observations facilitate
the security computing tasks.
Corollary 5. The cooperation value of SAVE-A satisfies
λ≤ 1
J
J∑
j=1
√√√√ 1
T
+
1
KT
T∑
t=1
(∣∣Kjt∪Sjt ∣∣−∣∣Sjt ∣∣+1(Sjt 6=∅)).(35)
Proof. See Appendix F.
Similar to the stochastic jamming case, Corollary 5 asserts
that more side observations lead to lower security risk.
V. SIMULATION TESTS
In this section, numerical tests are presented based on both
synthetic and real data.
A. Synthetic data tests
Our first test will rely on synthetic data. Consider K = 5
edge servers, and J = 1 device with ρ = 0.8 over T =
400 slots. The tasks’ resource requirement ct is generated by
ct = (0.6 + 0.5vt) cos 2t, where vt is uniformly distributed in
[0, 1]; and st is given by st = (0.25 + 0.3vt)xt, where vt is
again uniformly distributed in [0, 1]; and xt is uniform random
variable in [0.8, 1.2]. For the corresponding security risks γ1,t
is generated by
γ1,t(k) =
2k
3
(| sin t|+ 0.8 + |v1|) (36)
with v1 being a Gaussian random variable v1 ∼ N (0, 1.44),
and γ2,t is generated by
γ2,t(k) =
k
2
(
0.5 sin t+ 0.75 + |v2|
)
(37)
with v2 ∼ N (0, 0.64).
Before considering side observations, it is beneficial to
demonstrate the effectiveness of SAVE-S and SAVE-A under
a standard bandit setting without cooperation among devices.
TABLE I
SIDE OBSERVATION (SO) PROBABILITY
Server S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
Is SO 1 1 0 0 1 0.3 1 0.6 0.5 0
Not SO 0 0 1 1 0 0.7 0 0.4 0.5 1
TABLE II
SERVER ON/OFF PROBABILITY
Server S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
On 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 0.6 0.3 1 0.6 0.5 0.8
Off 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0.4 0.7 0 0.4 0.5 0.2
For fairness, we consider the stochastic jammers, where
SAVE-S and SAVE-A both enjoy theoretical guarantees. The
jamming probability of edge servers is listed in the left part
of Table II. The security risks of SAVE-S and SAVE-A with
different stepsizes, and the EXP4G in [24] slightly modified to
suit our scenario, are plotted in Fig. 4. The proposed SAVE-S
and SAVE-A with different stepsizes all outperform EXP4G
except for SAVE-A with adaptive stepsizes. It can be seen
that, SAVE-S outperforms SAVE-A, which can be explained
because the number of arms in SAVE-S is smaller and thus
fewer exploitation are needed.
To showcase the improvement attained from side observa-
tions, instead of receiving security risks directly from other
devices, an alternative method is adopted where the side
observations are obtained probabilistically. Specifically, for the
first 200 slots, the probability of revealing each edge server’s
risk is listed in the white part of Table I; and for the rest of
the slots, it is listed in the blue part of Table I.
No jamming: In Figs. 5 (a1) and (a2), the SAVE-S
and SAVE-A are compared with their corresponding non-
cooperative variants, respectively. Clearly, the cooperation
improves the regret of SAVE-S by a percentage of 54.49%,
53.08% and 47.47% for fixed, diminishing, and adaptive
stepsizes, respectively. Regarding SAVE-A, the improvement
thanks to cooperation is 50.22%, 52.17% and 50.03% along
with fixed, diminishing, and adaptive stepsizes. As confirmed
by simulations, the cooperation significantly improves the
regret performance of SAVE-S and SAVE-A; e.g., the coop-
eration values are λ = 0.5074 and λ = 0.4985, respectively.
Stochastic jamming attacks: Suppose that the servers
are under attack by stochastic jammers, where the on-off
probability of edge servers is listed in Table II. The simulations
shown in Figs. 5 (b1) and (b2) illustrate that the cooperation
improves the regret of SAVE-S by a percentage of 28.53%,
16.34% and 29.07% for fixed, diminishing, and adaptive
stepsizes, respectively. In the present test, the cooperation
value is λ = 0.4959. Regarding SAVE-A, the improvement
provided by cooperation is 37.33%, 34.31%, and 45.84%
when fixed, diminishing, and adaptive stepsizes are adopted,
where the cooperation value is λ = 0.5196.
Adversarial jamming attacks: With adversarial jammers,
the difference in data generation is that in the first 200 slots
the probability of server being jammed follows the left part of
Table II, while the rest of the time the probability follows the
right part of Table II. Fig. 5 (c1) depicts the performance of
SAVE-S, which is not guaranteed to obtain sublinear regret.
On the other hand, Fig. 5 (c2) compares the performance of
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Fig. 5. Synthetic data tests: (a1) SAVE-S without jamming attacks; (a2) SAVE-A without jamming attacks; (b1) SAVE-S with stochastic jamming attacks;
(b2) SAVE-A with stochastic jamming attacks; (c1) SAVE-S with adversarial jamming attacks; (c2) SAVE-A with adversarial attacks.
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Fig. 6. Real data tests: (a) SAVE-S for stochastic jamming attacks; (b) SAVE-A for stochastic attacks; (c) SAVE-A for adversarial jamming attacks.
TABLE III
SERVER ON/OFF PROBABILITY
Link 1 to 2 1 to 3 2 to 1 2 to 3 3 to 1 3 to 2
Cooperation 0.1 0.4 0 0.5 0.6 0.3
No Cooperation 0.9 0.6 1 0.5 0.4 0.7
SAVE-A with different stepsizes. The cooperation improves
the regret of SAVE-A by a percentage of 21.82%, 30.24%
and 37.75% for fixed, diminishing, and adaptive stepsizes
respectively, along with λ = 0.5412.
B. Real data tests
The performance of SAVE-S and SAVE-A is further tested
on a real world dataset [12], which contains the customers’
feedback on cloud service from public websites such as
Cloud Hosting Reviews, where more than 10,000 feedback
information form nearly 7,000 consumers over 113 cloud
services are collected. The consumers’ feedback is the service
trust (using risk γ1,t and γ2,t for negative trust). In this test,
we consider K = 3 edge servers and J = 3 IoT devices. The
information sharing probability values are listed in Table III.
The SAVE-S for combating stochastic jammers is shown in
Fig. 6 (a). SAVE-S with different stepsizes outperform EXP4G
with diminishing stepsize exposing the smallest average se-
curity risk. In this case, cooperation slightly improves the
regret performance at a percentage of 20.54%, 23.52% and
19.38% for fixed, diminishing, and adaptive stepsizes. The
cooperation value in this case is λ = 0.7123. The SAVE-A
under stochastic jamming is shown in Fig. 6 (b). Even without
cooperation, SAVE-A with fixed stepsize and diminishing
stepsize outperforms EXP4G. Meanwhile, the cooperation
improves the regret 58.87%, 53.70% and 56.96% for fixed,
diminishing, and adaptive stepsizes respectively, together with
a cooperation value λ = 0.6301.
Regarding adversarial jammers, Fig. 6 (c) shows how co-
operation improves the regret of SAVE-A by a percentage
of 50.18%, 49.52% and 63.83% for fixed, diminishing, and
adaptive stepsizes, respectively; while the cooperation value
is λ = 0.6265. We further compare the time averaged security
risk in SAVE-S with SAVE-A in Fig. 7 under stochastic
jamming attacks without cooperations. It is seen that SAVE-S
with different stepsizes all outperform SAVE-A.
90 300 600 900 1200 1500
Time slot
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
Ti
m
e 
av
er
ag
e 
se
cu
rit
y 
ris
k
SAVE-S-f
SAVE-S-d
SAVE-S-a
SAVE-A-f
SAVE-A-d
SAVE-A-a
EXP4G
Fig. 7. A comparison of SAVE-S and SAVE-A using real data.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Online security-aware edge computing under jamming at-
tacks was studied in this paper. Different from the common
ways such as expanding spectrum or increasing transmission
power, we developed schemes suitable for low-power IoT
devices. Specifically, we developed our SAVE-S and SAVE-
A algorithms to offload tasks to the most reliable server
under stochastic and adversarial jamming attacks, respectively.
Sublinear regret for both schemes was analytically established.
Performance of SAVE-S and SAVE-A was further enhanced
via cooperation among devices. Analysis confirmed the value
of cooperation via the marked improvement on the regret
bound. Numerical tests on both synthetic and real datasets
demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed schemes.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof starts with a simple case, where for a single
device j, we have Kjt = K˜, ∀t.
Lemma 2. If Kjt = K˜, ∀t, then SAVE-S guarantees that
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)r
j
t (k)−
T∑
t=1
rjt (k
∗)≤
T∑
t=1
(
µjt+
ηjt
2
)
Qjt+
lnK
ηjT+1
(38)
where k∗ denotes the best fixed server among K˜ in hindsight.
Proof. Upon defining auxiliary variables W jt :=
∑K
k=1 exp
[−
ηjt Rˆ
j
t−1(k)
]
, and W˜ jt :=
∑K
k=1 exp
[−ηjt−1Rˆjt−1(k)], we have
1
ηjt
ln
(
W˜ jt+1
W jt
)
=
1
ηjt
ln
(∑K
k=1 exp
[− ηjt Rˆjt (k)]
W jt
)
=
1
ηjt
ln
( K∑
k=1
wjt (k) exp
[− ηjt rˆjt (k)]
W jt
)
=
1
ηjt
ln
( K∑
k=1
pjt (k) exp
[− ηjt rˆjt (k)])
(a)
≤ 1
ηjt
ln
( K∑
k=1
pjt (k)
(
1− ηjt rˆjt (k) +
1
2
(
ηjt rˆ
j
t (k)
)2))
(39)
where (a) is due to e−x ≤ 1− x+ x22 , ∀x ≥ 0. The bound in
(39) can be further bounded as
1
ηjt
ln
( K∑
k=1
pjt (k)
(
1− ηjt rˆjt (k) +
1
2
(
ηjt rˆ
j
t (k)
)2))
=
1
ηjt
ln
(
1− ηjt
K∑
k=1
rˆjt (k)p
j
t (k) +
(
ηjt
)2
2
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)
(
rˆjt (k)
)2)
(b)
≤ −
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)rˆ
j
t (k) +
ηjt
2
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)
(
rˆjt (k)
)2
(40)
where (b) follows from ln(1− x) ≤ −x, ∀x ≥ 0. Therefore,
we have
1
ηjt
ln
(
W˜ jt+1
W jt
)
≤ −
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)rˆ
j
t (k) +
ηjt
2
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)
(
rˆjt (k)
)2
.
(41)
Rearranging (41), we arrive at
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)rˆ
j
t (k) ≤
ηjt
2
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)
(
rˆjt (k)
)2
+
1
ηjt
ln
W jt
W˜ jt+1
(42)
=
ηjt
2
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)
(
rˆjt (k)
)2
+
(
lnW jt
ηjt
− lnW
j
t+1
ηjt+1
)
+
(
lnW jt+1
ηjt+1
− ln W˜
j
t+1
ηjt
)
.
To bound
lnW jt+1
ηjt+1
− ln W˜
j
t+1
ηjt
, notice that
W jt+1 =
K∑
k=1
exp
[− ηjt+1rˆjt (k)]
(c)
≤K
( K∑
k=1
1
K
exp[−ηjt rˆjt (k)]
)ηjt+1/ηjt
= K(η
j
t−ηjt+1)/ηjt
( K∑
k=1
exp
[− ηjt rˆjt (k)])ηjt+1/ηjt
= K(η
j
t−ηjt+1)/ηjt (W˜ jt+1)
ηjt+1/η
j
t (43)
where (c) stems from ηjt+1 ≤ ηjt , and the concavity of
(·)ηjt+1/ηjt . Taking logarithms on both sides, and rearranging
terms leads to
lnW jt+1
ηjt+1
− ln W˜
j
t+1
ηjt
≤
(
1
ηjt+1
− 1
ηjt
)
lnK. (44)
Plugging (44) into (42) and summing up over t =
1, 2, . . . , T , we arrive at
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)rˆ
j
t (k) ≤
T∑
t=1
ηjt
2
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)
(
rˆjt (k)
)2
+
(
1
ηjT+1
− 1
ηj1
)
lnK +
lnW j1
ηj1
− lnW
j
T+1
ηjT+1
(d)
=
T∑
t=1
ηjt
2
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)
(
rˆjt (k)
)2
+
(
1
ηjT+1
− 1
ηj1
)
lnK− lnW
j
T+1
ηjT+1
(45)
where (d) follows from W j1 = 1. Since the estimators
in (8) can be written compactly using (9), with p˜jt (k) :=
10
∑
(m,k)∈Gjt p
j
t (m), we have
E
[ K∑
k=1
pjt (k)rˆ
j
t (k)
]
=
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)r
j
t (k)
(
1− µ
j
t
µjt + p˜
j
t (k)
)
=
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)r
j
t (k)−
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)r
j
t (k)
µjt
µjt + p˜
j
t (k)
(e)
≥
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)r
j
t (k)− µjtQjt (46)
where E is w.r.t. the probability that rjt (k) is observed; and
(e) follows from the assumption rjt (k) ≤ 1 and the definition
of Qjt . The mean square in (45) can be bounded as
E
[ K∑
k=1
pjt (k)
(
rˆjt (k)
)2] ≤ K∑
k=1
pjt (k)p˜
j
t (k)
(
rjt (k)
)2(
µjt + p˜
j
t (k)
)2
≤
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)
(
rjt (k)
)2
µjt + p˜
j
t (k)
≤
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)
1
µjt + p˜
j
t (k)
≤ Qjt . (47)
For the third term in (45), we have
E
[
− lnW
j
T+1
ηjT+1
]
= E
[
− ln
∑K
k=1 w
j
T+1(k)
ηjT+1
]
(f)
≤E
[
− ln
∑K
k=1 p
j(k)wkT+1
ηjT+1
]
(g)
≤ E
[
−
K∑
k=1
pj(k)
lnwjT+1(k)
ηjT+1
]
=E
[
−
K∑
k=1
pj(k)
−ηjT+1RˆjT+1(k)
ηjT+1
]
(h)
≤
K∑
k=1
pj(k)
T∑
t=1
rjt (k) (48)
where (f) follows since ln(·) is monotonically increasing
and {pj(k)} is a fixed distribution; (g) is due to Jensen’s
inequality; and (h) follows since rˆjt (k) as well as Rˆ
j
t (k) are
underestimators. Taking expectation on (45), and combining
(46)-(48), we have
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)r
j
t (k)−
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
pj(k)rjt (k)
≤
T∑
t=1
(
µjt +
ηjt
2
)
Qjt +
(
1
ηjT+1
− 1
ηj1
)
lnK (49)
which completes the proof.
Lemma 2 bounds the regret when the active server set is
time-invariant. Similar to [22], [24], with the instantaneous
regret of device j defined as V jt
(Kt) := ∑Kk=1 pjt (k)rjt (k)−
Φj∗(Kjt ), the key step is to decouple the expected regret as
T∑
t=1
E
[
V jt
(Kt)] = T∑
t=1
∑
K˜⊆K
P(Kjt = K˜)E
[
V jt
(Kt)∣∣Kjt = K˜]
=
∑
K˜⊆K
P(Kjt = K˜)
T∑
t=1
E
[
V jt
(K˜)∣∣Kjt = K˜]
(a)
=
∑
K˜⊆K
P(Kjt = K˜)E
[
T∑
t=1
(
µjt +
ηjt
2
)
Qjt +
lnK
ηjT+1
∣∣∣∣Kjt = K˜
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
(
µjt +
ηjt
2
)
Qjt +
lnK
ηjT+1
]
(50)
where in (a) we used the result of Lemma 2.
B. Bound of Qjt for stochastic jamming attacks
To evaluate the regret bound in Theorem 1, we provide a
bound on Qjt in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If µjt ≤ 1 for every t, then Qjt is bounded by
1
1 + µjt
≤ Qjt ≤ αjt +
∑
k∈Sjt
pjt (k)−
∑
k∈Sjt
µjtp
j
t (k)
2
(51)
where αjt is the independence number of Gjt .
Proof. Recall the definition of Qjt in (15). If k ∈ Sjt , we
have pjt (k)/
(
µjt +
∑
(m,k)∈Gjt p
j
t (m)
)
= pjt (k)/(1+µ
j
t ), while
for k /∈ Sjt , we have pjt (k)/
(
µjt +
∑
(m,k)∈Gjt p
j
t (m)
)
=
pjt (k)/(p
j
t (k) + µ
j
t ). First, we readily find that
Qjt =
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)
µjt +
∑
(m,k)∈Gjt p
j
t (m)
≥
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)
µjt + 1
=
1
1 + µjt
.
(52)
On the other hand, for k ∈ Sjt , it holds that pjt (k)/
(
µjt +∑
(m,k)∈Gjt p
j
t (m)
)
= pjt (k)/(1 + µ
j
t ); while for k /∈ Sjt , we
have pjt (k)/
(
µjt +
∑
(m,k)∈Gjt p
j
t (m)
)
= pjt (k)/(p
j
t (k) + µ
j
t ).
Hence,
Qjt =
∑
k∈Sjt
pjt (k)
1 + µjt
+
∑
k/∈Sjt
pjt (k)
pjt (k) + µ
j
t
(a)
≤
∑
k∈Sjt
pjt (k)
(
1− µ
j
t
2
)
+
∑
k/∈Sjt
pjt (k)
pjt (k) + µ
j
t
≤ αjt +
∑
k∈Sjt
pjt (k)−
∑
k∈Sjt
µjtp
j
t (k)
2
(53)
where (a) uses the inequality 11+x ≤ 1− x2 ,∀x ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 3 can be adopted to bound the cooperation value
λj . Since for the considered graph we have αjt = K − |Sjt |,
the upper bound of Qjt in Lemma 3 can be rewritten as Q
j
t ≤
min{K,K−|Sjt |+ 1}. Then plugging it into the definition of
λj , and using the fact that δ ≤ K, we have
λj ≤
√√√√ 1
T
+
1
KT
T∑
t=1
min
{
K,K + 1− |Sjt |
}
. (54)
Summing over j, yields the upper bound of λ.
C. Proof of Corollary 1
Without cooperation, it clearly holds that
Qjt =
K∑
k=1
pjt (k)
pjt (k) + µ
j
t
≤ K. (55)
For ηjt =
√
lnK
KT and µ
j
t =
ηjt
2 , (14) becomes
E
[
RegjT
] ≤ ηjT+1KT + lnK
ηjT+1
= 2
√
TK lnK. (56)
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On the other hand, if ηjt =
√
lnK
2Kt and µ
j
t =
ηjt
2 ,∀t, and the
independence between ηjt and Q
j
t implies
E
[
RegjT
] ≤ K T∑
t=1
ηjt +
lnK
ηjT+1
≤ 2
√
2TK lnK, (57)
where the inequality follows since
∑T
t=1 1/
√
t ≤ 2√T .
D. Proof of Corollary 2
The proof builds on the following lemma.
Lemma 4. With Q1, Q2, · · · , QT and K denoting positive
real numbers, the following inequality holds
T∑
t=1
Qt
2
√
δ +
∑t
τ=1Qτ
≤
√√√√δ + T∑
t=1
Qt −
√
δ. (58)
Proof. For x ≤ 1, we have the inequality x2 ≤ 1 −
√
1− x.
Replacing x with Qt/
(
δ +
∑t
τ=1Qτ
) ≤ 1, we have
Qt
2
(
δ +
∑t
τ=1Qτ
) ≤ 1−√1− Qt
δ +
∑t
τ=1Qτ
. (59)
Then multiplying both sides with
√
δ+
∑t
τ=1Qτ , we arrive at
Qt
2
√
δ+
∑t
τ=1Qτ
≤
√√√√δ+ t∑
τ=1
Qτ−
√√√√δ+ t−1∑
τ=1
Qτ . (60)
Taking summation over T , completes the proof.
We are ready to prove the corollary. For a specific realization
of Qjt , upon choosing η
j
t =
√
(lnK)/
(
K +
∑t−1
τ=1Q
j
τ
)
, and
µjt = η
j
t /2, we arrive at
T∑
t=1
(
µjt +
ηjt
2
)
Qjt =
T∑
t=1
Qjt
√
lnK√
K +
∑t−1
τ=1Q
j
τ
≤
T∑
t=1
Qjt
√
lnK√
K −Qjt +
∑t
τ=1Q
j
τ
(a)
≤
T∑
t=1
Qjt
√
lnK√
δ +
∑t
τ=1Q
j
τ
(b)
≤
√√√√(δ + T∑
t=1
Qt
)
lnK (61)
where (a) uses δ := mint{K − Qjt} which is strictly greater
than 0 according to Lemma 3; and (b) follows from Lemma
4. Then, it is easy to see that
T∑
t=1
(
µjt +
ηjt
2
)
Qjt +
lnK
ηjT+1
≤ 2
√√√√(δ + T∑
t=1
Qt
)
lnK (62)
Taking E w.r.t. the servers on/off probability on (62), we
complete the proof. The bound (62) can be approximated by
2
√∑T
t=1Qt lnK, since δ lnK is not the dominant term.
E. Proof of Lemma 1
To show that
(
qjt
)>
rˇjt =
(
pjt
)>
rjt , it suffices to prove(
qjt
)>
Γ
(Kjt) = (pjt)>. The key is the special structure of
Γ
(Kjt) ∈ {0, 1}Kˇ×K . For k /∈ Kjt , the k-th column is all 0.
And for k ∈ Kjt , the k-th column has Kˇ/K entries equal to
1 and other entries 0. Besides, each row of Γ
(Kjt) has only
one non-zero entry since each server list only has one output
given Kjt . Without loss of generality, let rows (m−1)Kˇ/K+
1, . . . Kˇ/K of Γ
(Kjt) be of the form [0, · · · , 1, · · · , 0] with
the m-th entry being 1. Then
(
qjt
)>
Γ
(Kjt)=(pjt)> becomes∑mKˇ/K
k=(m−1)Kˇ/K+1 q
j
t (k) = p
j
t (m),∀m ∈ K, which has at least
one solution in ∆Kˇ .
F. Bound of Qjt for adversarial jamming attacks
Recall the definition of Qjt for adversarial jammers in
(31), where Gjt has Kˇ nodes. Define node set N1 as the
nodes satisfing Φ(K˜jt ) ∈ Sjt ; and collect other nodes in
set N2. Specifically, for k ∈ N1, we have qjt (k)/
(
µjt +∑
(m,k)∈Gjt q
j
t (m)
)
= qjt (k)/(1 + µ
j
t ). Since the structure of
Gjt depends on the available set Kjt and the side observation
set Sjt , the next lemma presents Kjt and Sjt dependent bounds
on Qjt .
Lemma 5. Quantity Qjt satisfies the following
1
1 + µjt
≤ Qjt ≤|Kjt ∪ Sjt
∣∣− ∣∣Sjt ∣∣+ 1(Sjt 6= ∅).
Proof. Following steps similar to those in proving Lemma 3,
it can be shown that Qjt ≥ 11+µjt . To derive the upper bound,
consider first that there are no side observations, meaning
N1 = ∅. Leveraging the definition of Qjt and the symmetric
structure of Gjt in this case, it is easy to see that Qjt ≤ |Kjt |.
Then consider N1 6= ∅, which means that side observations
are available. For the nodes in N1, we have∑
k∈N1
qjt (k)
µjt+
∑
(m,k)∈Gjt q
j
t (m)
=
∑
k∈N1
qjt (k)
µjt+1
(a)
≤ 1, (63)
where (a) uses the fact that
∑
k∈N1 q
j
t (k) ≤ 1. Then leveraging
the structure of Gjt , we have for the nodes of N2,∑
k∈N2
qjt (k)
µjt+
∑
(m,k)∈Gjt q
j
t (m)
≤
∑
I
∑
k∈I
qjt (k)∑
(m,k)∈G¯jt q
j
t (m)
≤
∑
I
∑
k∈I q
j
t (k)∑
k∈I q
j
t (k)
(b)
=
∣∣Kjt ∪ Sjt ∣∣− ∣∣Sjt ∣∣ (64)
where G¯jt is the subgraph of Gjt without unidirectional edges; I
collects the cliques in G¯jt ; and (b) uses |I| =
∣∣Kjt ∪Sjt ∣∣− ∣∣Sjt ∣∣.
Adding (63) and (64), we obtain the upper bound on Qjt for
N1 6= ∅. Writing the upper bound on Qjt for both N1 6= ∅ and
N1 = ∅ compactly, completes the proof of the lemma.
Simply plugging the results of Lemma 5 into the definition
of λj , we can upper bound λj of SAVE-A as
λj≤
√√√√ 1
T
+
1
KT
T∑
t=1
(∣∣Kjt ∪ Sjt ∣∣− ∣∣Sjt ∣∣+ 1(Sjt 6= ∅)). (65)
Summing over j, leads to the upperbound on λ.
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